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Abstract
Deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial ma-
nipulations in the input domain. The extent of vulnerability
has been explored intensively in cases of `p-bounded and
`p-minimal adversarial perturbations. However, the vul-
nerability of DNNs to adversarial perturbations with spe-
cific statistical properties or frequency-domain character-
istics has not been sufficiently explored. In this paper, we
study the smoothness of perturbations and propose Smooth-
Fool, a general and computationally efficient framework
for computing smooth adversarial perturbations. Through
extensive experiments, we validate the efficacy of the pro-
posed method for both the white-box and black-box at-
tack scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate that: (i)
there exist extremely smooth adversarial perturbations for
well-established and widely used network architectures, (ii)
smoothness significantly enhances the robustness of pertur-
bations against state-of-the-art defense mechanisms, (iii)
smoothness improves the transferability of adversarial per-
turbations across both data points and network architec-
tures, and (iv) class categories exhibit a variable range of
susceptibility to smooth perturbations. Our results suggest
that smooth APs can play a significant role in exploring the
vulnerability extent of DNNs to adversarial examples. The
code is available at https://github.com/alldbi/SmoothFool
1. Introduction
Despite revolutionary achievements of deep neural net-
works (DNNs) in many computer vision tasks [22, 44],
carefully manipulated input samples, known as adversar-
ial examples, can fool learning models to confidently make
wrong predictions [40]. Adversarial examples are poten-
tial threats to almost all applications of machine learning
[2, 13, 18], but the case is more severe in the context of
Figure 1: Comparing smooth APs with conventional APs.
Each column from left to right shows the adversarial image
and the corresponding APs computed by DeepFool [31],
SmoothFool (σg = 75) and IGSM [23], respectively, on
ResNet-101 [14]. The predicted label for each image is de-
picted above the column. Perturbations are magnified for a
better visibility.
computer vision, particularly, due to the complexity of tasks
[36], huge cardinality of input spaces [41], and sensitivity
of applications [10, 16, 43, 38]. Analyzing DNNs as dif-
ferentiable transfer functions have led to substantial stud-
ies exploring embedding spaces and their characteristics in
regard to training paradigms. However, the adversarial be-
havior has highlighted the importance of studying the topol-
ogy of decision boundaries and their properties in high di-
mensional data spaces [36, 15]. Considering a white-box
scenario where the network architecture and all its parame-
ters are known, several approaches (attacks) have been pro-
posed to explore the robustness of decision boundaries in
the presence of `p-bounded [40, 12, 23] and `p-minimal
[31, 1, 33, 39, 29] adversarial perturbations (APs). How-
ever, the vulnerability of DNNs to APs with specific statis-
tical properties or frequency-domain characteristics, which
lie beyond the conventional `p-norm constraints, has re-
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mained less explored.
In this study, we seek to explore the landscape of ro-
bustness of DNNs to APs with modified frequency-domain
characteristics. Specifically, we focus on smooth APs due to
several advantages they offer compared to the conventional
APs. First, they are more physically realizable than non-
smooth APs since printing devices are critically less accu-
rate in capturing high frequency structures due to the sam-
pling noise [37]. Also, severe differences between adjacent
pixels in the printed adversarial examples are unlikely to be
accurately captured by cameras due to their low-pass spatial
frequency response [19]. Second, the high-frequency struc-
ture of conventional APs has provoked an intensive adop-
tion of explicit [32, 26, 34] and implicit [41, 27, 35] denois-
ing methods to mitigate the adversarial effect. However,
we demonstrate that a slight modification of local statis-
tics of APs causes a vital failure of state-of-the-art defenses.
Third, smoothness significantly enhances the transferability
of APs across classifiers and data points by improving the
invariance of perturbations to translation [6]. This improves
the performance of the attack in the black-box scenario
where the parameters of the target model are not known to
the adversary. Forth, smoothness enhances plausible deni-
ability and allows the attacker to disguise APs as natural
phenomena such as shadows. In this way, the magnitude of
APs can be increased notably since imperceptibility is less
important.
We formulate the problem of constructing smooth APs
according to a general definition of smoothness and exploit
the geometry of decision boundaries to find computation-
ally efficient solutions. Our main contributions are the fol-
lowings:
• We propose SmoothFool, a geometry inspired frame-
work for computing smooth APs which exploits the
topology of decision boundaries to find efficient APs.
• We analyze various properties of smooth APs and val-
idate their effectiveness for both the white-box and
black-box attack scenarios.
• We show the susceptibility of two major group of de-
fenses against smooth APs by breaking several state-
of-the-art defenses.
• We integrate SmoothFool with previous studies on uni-
versal APs and demonstrate the existence of smooth
universal APs that generalize well across data samples
and network architectures.
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial Attack
Despite the highly non-linear nature of DNNs, they
have been observed to exhibit linear characteristics around
the actual parameters of the model and the input samples
[12, 8, 9]. In particular, Goodfellow et al. [12] showed that
the prediction of DNNs can be changed drastically by trans-
lating the input sample toward the gradient of the classi-
fication loss. Hence, they proposed the fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) as a single step attack incorporating solely
the sign of gradients to craft APs. Kurakin et al. [23] im-
proved the performance of FGSM by adopting an iterative
procedure called IGSM. Moosavi et al. [31] proposed Deep-
Fool to find approximately `p-minimal APs by iteratively
translating input samples toward the linearized approxima-
tion of the closest decision boundary. Our methodology
builds on DeepFool to find minimal smooth APs.
Some prior studies have considered smoothness in adver-
sarial attacks. Sharif et al. [37] added a total variation (TV)
loss to the main objective of the attack to enhance the phys-
ical realizability of the resulting perturbations and showed
that smoothness of APs improves their effectiveness for the
real-world applications. Fong et al. [11] demonstrated that
smoothing important regions in the input example can dete-
riorate the confidence of prediction. They utilized this ob-
servation to interpret the decisions of DNNs. Hosseini et
al. [17] proposed constructing semantic adversarial exam-
ples by randomly shifting Hue and Saturation components
of benign samples in the HSV color space. Dong et al. [6]
demonstrated that robustness of DNNs to slight translations
can be exploited to improve the trasferability of adversarial
examples. Interestingly, the final perturbations crafted us-
ing their approach exhibited low-pass frequency response.
However, their methodology is applicable for a limited level
of smoothness since the prediction of DNNs is invariant for
solely small translations of the input sample.
Fundamentally, our work differs from previous ap-
proaches since we seek to find approximately `2-minimal
APs capable of offering arbitrary levels of smoothness.
Also, our main goal is to formulate and compute smooth
APs, not to find smooth adversarial examples, since the lat-
ter can critically destroy the structure of images.
2.2. Defense Methods
Since the first observation of APs, their noisy structure
has been harnessed to find defense strategies. Several stud-
ies have incorporated explicit denoising techniques to mit-
igate the adversarial effect. Liao et al. [26] showed that
the distribution of high-level representations in DNNs pro-
vides an effective guidance to denoise adversarial examples
and proposed the high-level representation guided denoiser
(HGD). Training DNNs using adversarial examples, known
as adversarial training [12, 27, 41], has been shown to pro-
vide a relative adversarial robustness. Adversarial training
can be considered as an implicit denoising technique which
reduces the sensitivity of predictions to slight changes in
the input domain. Manifold learning is another implicit de-
noising defense. A well-known example for this type of de-
fense is MagNet [28] which deploys autoencoders for map-
ping input examples onto the manifold of natural examples.
Later, we utilize these defenses to evaluate the effectiveness
of smooth APs.
3. Smooth Adversarial Perturbations
3.1. Problem Definition
Let f : Rn → Rm be a classifier mapping input sample
x ∈ [0, 1]n tom classification scores fj(x), associated with
each class j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}. The class predicted by the
network can be computed as:
c(x) = arg max
j
fj(x). (1)
The problem of constructing smooth APs can be formulated
as the following optimization problem:
arg min
r
||r||2 + λΩ(r) subject to:
1. c(x + r) 6= c(x),
2. x + r ∈ [0, 1]n,
(2)
where r ∈ Rn is the AP, Ω(.) is a measure of roughness, and
λ is a Lagrangian coefficient controlling the trade-off be-
tween roughness and magnitude of the perturbation. Gener-
ally, the roughness of perturbations can be defined based on
their local variations. Such variations have an explicit inter-
pretation in the frequency domain where the power of each
frequency component captures the specific range of varia-
tions. Considering this perspective, we use a frequency re-
sponse function H to formulate the definition of roughness
since it can denote how much each frequency component
contributes to the intended roughness. For clarity, we sub-
stituteH withHhp to highlight the high-frequency nature of
roughness and denoteHlp = 1−Hhp as the complementary
low-pass filter which defines the equivalent smoothness. We
use the total energy of the high-frequency components of r
as a general measure of roughness, and define Ω as:
Ω(r, Hlp) :=
∫ +∞
−∞
R(ω)2(1−Hlp(ω))2dω, (3)
where R is the Fourier transformation of perturbation r,
and Hlp is the frequency response of a given low-pass filter
defining the range of acceptable smoothness, and is a free
parameter of the definition.
The perturbation r in our problem is represented as a
set of spatially discrete APs for each pixel location u ∈
{0, . . . , n− 1}1, and Ω can be conveniently computed in
the spatial domain as:
Ω(r;h) = ||r − r ∗ h||22, (4)
1Here we assume the input image x is a 1D signal, and later in the
experiments we adopt all formulations for 2D images.
Figure 2: Finding smooth AP for a linear binary classifier.
Red and blue dots show the `2 projection and smooth pro-
jection of x onto the decision boundary, respectively. For an
easier demonstration, x is assumed to belong to class −1.
where ∗ denotes convolution, and h is the discrete approx-
imation of Hlp in the spatial domain. In the rest of the pa-
per, our work builds on this definition of roughness (and,
equivalently, smoothness) and aims to find APs which are
relatively smooth based on any predefined h compared to
perturbations crafted by other contemporary attacks. Due
to the non-convex nature of the problem, we exploit the
geometric properties of the decision boundary of DNNs to
find a relaxed solution for the optimization problem given
in Equation 2.
3.2. Linearized solution
Based on previous findings [31, 20, 8], the decision
boundary of a differentiable classifier, f , around x can
be well approximated by a hyperplane passing through the
minimal `2 adversarial example xp corresponding to x, and
the normal vector w orthogonal to the decision boundary
at xp as H , {x : w>(x − xp) = 0}. We assume
xp and, consequently, w associated with each x is avail-
able, and later we utilize an appropriate contemporary at-
tack to compute xp and w. Having xp provides two ben-
efits. First, it allows us to linearize the closest decision
boundary around x. Second, we can reduce the problem
to a binary classification problem, where the goal of the at-
tack would be to compute the smooth perturbation r which
yields c(x + r) = c(xp). Consequently, we rewrite the
optimization problem given in Equation 2 as:
arg min
r
||r||2 + λΩ(r;h) subject to:
1. w>(x + r)−w>xp = 0,
2. x + r ∈ [0, 1]n.
(5)
In this setup, an efficient solution can be obtained from a
smooth projection of x onto the estimated hyperplane H .
Such a projection can be computed by translating x using
the adversarial perturbation r = ρw˜, where w˜ is a smooth
approximation of w, and ρ scales w˜ to map x + r on H
as:
ρ =
w>(xp − x)
w>w˜
. (6)
Figure 3: A demonstration of the topology of the decision
boundary in the vicinity of data point x. U illustrates the
region where the decision boundary can be assumed to be
approximately flat. Smooth projection of x onto the esti-
mated hyperplaneH often results in a solution out of U .
Figure 2 provides a simple visualization of this projec-
tion. It worth mentioning that for the linear binary classifier
choice of f , the optimal smooth perturbation has the closed-
form solution: r = − f(x)
w>w˜
w˜. Generally, the estimation w˜
must hold two conditions to provide a valid solution for the
linearized problem. First, w˜ should not be orthogonal to
w. Second, the estimation should remove high-frequency
components of w in order to keep Ω(ρw˜;h) low. Without
loss of generality, we consider a low-pass filter g to esti-
mate w˜ by convolution as: w˜ = g ∗ w, since it is easy
to compute, and the only condition on g is that its cut-off
frequency should be less than the cut-off frequency of h.
The final smooth perturbation that can project x on H
can be computed as:
r =
w>(xp − x)
w>(g ∗w) (g ∗w). (7)
In this formulation, the cut-off frequency of g is associ-
ated with λ in the optimization problem given in Equation
5 since it controls the smoothness of perturbation r. `2-
DeepFool [31] constructs adversarial examples which are
shown to be a good approximation of the `2-minimal adver-
sarial example for an input sample, and the assumption of
flat decision boundaries around the constructed examples is
believed to be practically valid [31, 29]. Therefore, we uti-
lize it to generate xp and estimate w using the first order
Taylor expansion of f at xp as:
w = ∇fc(xp)(xp)−∇fc(x)(xp). (8)
In practice, the high-frequency structure of the gradients of
DNNs increases the angle betweenw and w˜. Consequently,
ρ in Equation 6 takes large values which often maps the in-
put sample outside the legitimate range [0, 1]n. In the next
section, we propose a smooth clipping technique to over-
come this problem.
Algorithm 1 SmoothClip
1: input: Image x, perturbation r, low-pass filter g, step size .
2: output: Smoothly clipped perturbation rc.
3: Initialize rc ← r.
4: while max(x + rc) > 1 or min(x + rc) < 0 do
5: m0 = 1>0(−(x + rc)) ∗ g,
6: m1 = 1>0((x + rc)− 1) ∗ g,
7: ∆1 = max(x + rc − 1)m1,
8: ∆0 = min(x + rc)m0,
9: rc ← rc − (∆1 + ∆0),
10: end while
11: return rc.
3.3. Validating Perturbations
The final adversarial example should reside inside the
valid range of the input domain. An ordinary approach to
hold this condition, especially in iterative attacks, is to clip
the resulting adversarial examples [23, 29]. The clipping
function, Clip, takes the constructed adversarial image and
truncates each pixel value independently to fall within the
valid range of the input space. However, applying this to
smooth perturbations as: rc = Clip(x + r) − x, will de-
teriorate the smoothness of perturbation. This is because
the clipping function truncates each pixel individually and
discards the local correlation between neighborhood pertur-
bations. Specifically, this issue happens at edges and high-
frequency areas of x as shown in Figure 5. A closed-form
solution for smooth clipping, which should consider neigh-
borhood correlation of perturbations (based on g), results
in a high complexity solution. We propose a simple and
iterative approach for smoothly clipping the out-of-bound
pixels. In the ith iteration, when the range of x + ri re-
mains out of the valid range, we compute masks m0 and
m1 as indicators of pixels which exceed the valid bound as:
mi0 = 1>0(−(x + ri)), (9)
mi1 = 1>0((x + r
i)− 1), (10)
where 1>0(.) is an indicator function that outputs 1 for el-
ements greater than zero. To incorporate the neighborhood
correlation of perturbations, we use the exact low-pass filter
g used in Equation 7 to propagate the out-of-bound error
to the neighborhood perturbations as: mi1 ← mi1 ∗ g and
mi0 ← mi0 ∗ g. Then, using a step size  and maximum
value of the out-of-bound error, we adjust the perturbation
as:
ri+1 = ri − max(x + ri − 1)mi1
−min(x + ri)mi0.
(11)
This iterative algorithm terminates when all pixels in x+ri
reside within the valid range. We refer to this algorithm as
SmoothClip, and Algorithm 1 summarizes its functionality.
Figure 4: Visual demonstration of increasing smoothness of APs. Each set of images, from left to right, show adversarial
examples and smooth APs computed for samples from ImageNet, CIFAR-10, and MNIST datasets on ResNet-101, ResNet-
18, and LeNet architectures, respectively. Samples are from ‘coucal’, ‘dog’, and ‘6’ classes and misclassified as ‘robin’,
‘bird’, and ‘0’.
Figure 5: An example of applying a normal clipping on a
smooth AP. Left: a benign sample correctly classified as
‘strawberry’ by VGG16. Middle: an adversarial example
classified as ‘pineapple’. Right: the perturbation after nor-
mal clipping.
3.4. General Solution
In a general case for a non-linear classifier f , there is no
guarantee that perturbations computed by Equation 7 cause
input samples to pass the actual non-linear boundary. Fig-
ure 3 demonstrates a visualization of this fact. To overcome
this problem, we adopt an iterative procedure. In each itera-
tion, using the closest adversarial example, xip, correspond-
ing to the samplexi, we linearize the decision boundary and
compute the smooth projection of xi on the approximated
hyperplane using Equation 7.
Afterward, we smoothly rectify the resulting perturba-
tion, r, and repeat this procedure until c(xi) 6= c(x0), as
detailed in Algorithm 2. Here, the smoothness of the final
perturbation depends on the smoothness in each iteration.
Consider rtot = xi − x0 = ∑ij=0 rj , where i is the total
number of iterations, and rj is the jth smooth AP. It can
be shown that the roughness of the overall perturbation is
bounded as: Ω(rtot;h) ≤ i2 maxj Ω(rj ;h). To compute
an AP with the desired level of roughness defined by h, we
select g such that ∀j : Ω(rj ;h)  ||rj ||22, i.e., the cut-
off frequency of g should be smaller than h. In practice,
maxj Ω(r
j ;h)  i−2, i.e., even for a significantly smooth
choices of g the algorithm converges in few iterations.
Algorithm 2 SmoothFool
1: input: Image x, low-pass filter g.
2: output: Smooth perturbation r.
3: Initialize x0 ← x, i← 0.
4: while cf (x0) = cf (xi) do
5: rp = DeepFool(xi),
6: xp = x
i + rp,
7: wi = ∇fc(xp)(xp)−∇fc(x)(xp),
8: w˜i = g ∗wi,
9: ri =
wi
>
(xip − xi)
wi>w˜i
w˜i,
10: ri ←SmoothClip(xi, ri, g),
11: xi+1 ← xi + ri,
12: i← i+ 1,
13: end while
14: return xi − x0.
4. Experiments
4.1. Setup
We evaluate the performance of SmoothFool on three
datasets including the test set of MNIST [25], the test set
of CIFAR-10 [21], and 10, 000 samples from the validation
set of ILSVRC2012 [5] (10 images per each class). For the
MNIST dataset, a two-layer fully-connected network (FC2)
and a LeNet [24] architecture are used. For the CIFAR-
10 dataset, we use a VGG-F [3] and ResNet-18 [14] archi-
tectures. For the ImageNet dataset, we consider VGG16
and ResNet-101. The accuracy of each model on benign
samples is shown in Table 1. We set the step size  of the
SmoothClip to 1, 0.5, 0.1 for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Im-
ageNet respectively, which results in a fast and reasonable
performance.
Defining smoothness. We define smoothness based on the
Gaussian blur function since it is practical and the cut-off
frequency can be easily changed by modifying the stan-
Figure 6: a, b, c) Fooling rate of the attack versus smoothing factor σg on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively. d)
Magnitude of perturbations vs. σg on ImageNet.
dard deviation. We assume h and g to be Gaussian blur
filters with isotropic standard deviations σh and σg , respec-
tively. In this setup, selecting any σg>σh will minimize
the roughness defined by h. Increasing σg improves the
smoothness of APs but reduces the performance of the at-
tack. To implement the Gaussian kernel, we set the kernel
width to 5σ.
Comparisons. For σg  1, the proposed approach con-
verges to DeepFool [31]. Hence, we use it as a baseline
to compare magnitude of the generated perturbations. For
the second baseline, we develop an attack based on [37]
by replacing the classical TV loss term with the roughness
penalty Ω(r;h) from Equation 4 to provide a fair compari-
son framework as:
arg min
r
(− Jc(f(x + r), yx) + λsΩ(r;σh)), (12)
where Jc is the cross-entropy loss function, and yx denotes
the ground truth label of sample x. We refer to this method
as the iterative smooth (IS) attack, and optimize it using
gradient descent with a initial step size (learning rate) of
10−3, and decay of 0.5 per each 100 iterations. We set λs
to 0.1, 0.01 and 0.05 for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet,
respectively, which results in the most possible smooth per-
turbations for σh=1. We consider this attack as the second
baseline. We also compare the proposed method to the se-
mantic adversarial examples given in [17], and refer to it
as the color-shift (CS) attack, and consider it as the third
baseline. We set the number of random trails of the CS al-
gorithm to 100. Since CS adds perturbations in the HSV
color space, we compute the average magnitude of pertur-
bations for this attack in the HSV space to provide a fair
comparison (the magnitude of APs in RGB color space is
observed to be approximately 10 times greater).
Evaluation metrics. We measure the fooling rate of the at-
tack and average smoothness of constructed APs. The fool-
ing rate is defined on the set of correctly classified benign
samples since it provides a more robust measure to evaluate
the attack. For the sake of brevity of explaining results, we
define σA%g as the maximum value of σg (minimum among
network architectures) that results in a A% fooling rate.
In order to evaluate the smoothness of constructed APs,
we measure the expected roughness Ω = EDs [Ω(rx,h)],
Figure 7: Examples of extremely smooth adversarial per-
turbations computed for ResNet-18 and CIFAR-10 dataset
with σg = 200.
where rx is the AP constructed for x, and Ds is the set of
successfully attacked samples. This measure is sensitive to
the magnitude of perturbations. Thus, we develop a second
measure by normalizing Ω over the total power of pertur-
bations as: Ωn =EDs [Ω(rx,h)/||rx||22]. Indeed, Ωn rela-
tively measures how much of the total power of the APs is
occupied by high-frequency components according to h.
4.2. General Performance
Figure 6 (a-c) shows the fooling rates of SmoothFool
versus σg . We observe that the pair (σ100%g , σ
20%
g ) for
MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet is (4.1, 7.8), (8.4, 124.4)
and (19.3, 165.3), respectively. As expected, the fooling
rate is highly dependent on the smoothing factor σg . How-
ever, the fooling rate remains high for significantly large
(compared to the size of the input image) values of σg on
ImageNet and CIFAR-10. For instance, σ50%g for CIFAR-10
is 32.8 which is approximately equal to the width of input
images and shows that it is possible to fool the classifier on
50% of samples solely by adding a carefully selected con-
stant value to all pixels of each color channel. The magni-
tude of smooth APs versus smoothness is depicted in Figure
6 (d). Increasing smoothness results in larger magnitudes of
APs since the projection of w˜ onto w will become smaller.
However, smoothness of perturbations allows larger magni-
tudes since they are not as perceptible when compared to
the noisy structure of contemporary APs.
We observe in Table 1 that SmoothFool with σg = 2
on all datasets, crafts significantly smoother (based on Ω
and Ωn with σh = 1) APs compared to the baseline attacks
Dataset Network Acc.(%)
F.Rate (%) Ω× 103 @ σh=1 Ωn × 103 @ σh=1 Ex[||rx||2] @ σg
IS CS DF IS CS SF DF IS CS SF DF IS CS SF
MNIST 1-FC2 98.6 98.0 - 783 591 - 334 511 308 - 63 1.17 2.81 - 1.762-LeNet 99.1 94.1 - 890 677 - 352 532 338 - 68 1.23 3.18 - 2.32
CIFAR-10 3-VGG-F 93.1 85.4 93.4 288 203 184 114 891 216 163 57 0.19 3.14 4.42 1.604-ResNet-18 93.3 87.8 89.1 310 206 199 127 959 287 175 65 0.21 3.63 4.93 1.60
ImageNet 5-VGG16 71.5 57.8 91.1 111 89 104 29 871 358 238 51 0.25 4.90 7.71 0.586-ResNet-101 77.3 62.6 92.7 108 83 95 16 827 300 207 36 0.28 4.82 7.56 0.55
7-ResNet-152 78.3 60.1 91.9 116 91 88 20 845 391 229 38 0.29 5.12 8.16 0.57
8-DenseNet161 77.6 66.0 90.3 107 79 86 16 795 309 212 35 0.28 3.47 5.58 0.57
9-InceptionV3 77.4 65.5 90.6 149 85 92 12 658 293 223 48 0.32 4.50 8.10 0.35
Table 1: Comparing SmoothFool (SF) to DeepFool (DF) [31], iterative smooth (IS) [37, 7], and color-shift (CS) [17] attacks.
To satisfy smoothness based on σh=1, σg is set to 2 for all datasets. Fooling rates of SF and DF are >99.9% on all datasets.
.
VGG-F ResNet-18
Class σg σg
20 60 100 20 60 100
airplane 75.0 29.5 25.0 67.3 34.7 28.2
automobile 58.7 10.8 6.5 33.3 6.6 2.2
bird 93.4 65.2 52.1 65.1 41.8 32.5
cat 100 58.3 43.7 65.3 21.1 17.3
deer 87.2 60.0 49.0 78.0 40.2 36.0
dog 78.7 48.9 40.4 75.1 55.5 52.7
frog 88.8 51.1 46.6 68.9 44.8 41.3
horse 74.5 29.0 23.6 70.3 25.9 22.2
ship 79.0 32.5 25.5 81.4 35.1 29.6
truck 73.9 32.6 21.7 68.5 31.4 22.8
all 83.8 45.8 37.6 67.2 33.0 27.9
Table 2: Per-class fooling rate (%) of SmoothFool for three
values of σg on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Bold and underlined
values show the fooling rate on classes with highest and
lowest robustness against smooth APs, respectively.
for the smoothness, while the magnitudes of APs are solely
1.8x larger than the state-of-the-art `2-minimal APs crafted
by DeepFool. Figure 4 shows some examples of smooth
APs computed for different levels of smoothness. We ob-
serve that each class responds differently as the smoothness
of APs increases. Table 2 shows the per-class fooling rate of
the attack on CIFAR-10. Smooth perturbations at σg = 100
fool the VGG-F classifier on more than 50% of samples
of the ‘bird’ class, while they are approximately not effec-
tive for the ‘car’ class. This shows that some classes are
severely sensitive to smooth perturbations while other ex-
hibit lower sensitivity. The network architecture has a direct
effect on this observation since the most sensitive class to
smooth APs for each specific value of σg is different among
network architectures.
Figure 7 demonstrates some examples of extremely
smooth APs on CIFAR-10, showing a similar behavior (in
RGB color space) as color-shifted adversarial examples
[17]. However, as the method in [17] randomly shifts Hue
and Saturation of benign samples, it often generates odd ad-
versarial examples such as ‘blue apples’ or ‘red lemons’
Fooling rate under defense (%)
Defense IGSM DF CS SF1 SF2 SF3
Adv. 32.6 15.6 64.5 58.6 70.7 78.0
PGD 21.0 12.3 61.4 57.2 67.3 72.8
Ens. 18.7 14.0 62.2 54.5 62.8 73.6
SAT 22.8 37.2 21.0 11.5 42.9 53.4
HGD 9.3 11.2 46.9 43.7 57.2 66.2
MagNet 10.7 8.9 25.1 46.4 65.5 52.6
Table 3: Evaluating attacks under different defense strate-
gies on a ResNet-18 trained on CIFAR-10. SF1, SF2, and
SF3 denote the proposed algorithm with σg of 1, 3, and 5,
respectively.
which are no longer adversarial examples since the con-
ceptual evidence of objects is destroyed. However, since
SmoothFool finds relatively small smooth perturbations, the
whole concept of an object will not change drastically after
the attack.
Performance under white-box defenses. Here, we eval-
uate the effectiveness of smooth perturbations against de-
fense methods. First, we evaluate the attack under defenses
based on adversarial training on FGSM (Adv.) [12], projec-
tile gradient descent (PGD) [27] and ensemble (Ens.) [41]
adversarial examples. We consider an additional defense of
training on adversarial examples computed by the proposed
SmoothFool with σg = 1, and refer to it as Smooth Adver-
sarial Training (SAT). Second, we consider the high-level
guided denoiser (HGD) [26] as a denoising based defense
and MagNet [28] as a defense which evaluates adversarial
examples using a learned distribution of natural samples. In
all experiments, we assume that attacks have zero knowl-
edge about the defense models.
Table 3 shows the performance of SmoothFool under
defenses. Results suggest that increasing the smoothness
of APs elevates the chance of bypassing defense methods.
Such a characteristic had been observed before in adversar-
ial examples constructed by spatial transformations [42, 4].
Smooth APs with σg = 5 successfully bypass HGD de-
Figure 8: Smooth universal APs crafted for VGG16 archi-
tecture (best viewed in color).
fense and defenses based on adversarial training on more
than 60% of samples. Similarly, the CS attack shows sig-
nificant robustness against all defenses except MagNet. A
reasonable explanation is that although the CS attack gen-
erates relatively smooth APs compared to conventional at-
tacks, changing the Hue and Saturation of images consider-
ably pushes samples outside the distribution of natural sam-
ples leaned by MagNet. SmoothFool bypasses MagNet by
a notable margin which indicates the closeness of generated
samples to the distribution of natural images. However, for
large values of σg , the magnitude of smooth APs takes large
values, and thus, degrades the fooling rate of SmoothFool
against MagNet defense. Furthermore, we observe that SAT
defense provides a relative robustness against smooth APs
constructed by σg = 1, but is susceptible to smoother per-
turbations. This suggest that the frequency components of
APs can play a crucial role in bypassing adversarial training
defenses trained on examples constructed by APs of differ-
ent frequency components.
Black-box performance and ablation on smoothing
functions. Here, we evaluate the black-box performance
of smooth APs. Since our algorithm computes `2-minimal
perturbations, we scale smooth APs to have the maximum
`∞-norm of 16 for pixel values in range 255 based on the
conventional setting for black-box attacks on ImageNet [6].
We consider two additional smooth functions including lin-
ear and uniform kernels to evaluate the effect of smoothing
functions on fooling rates and transferability of APs. The
uniform kernel of size k has all values equal to 1k2 . The
linear kernel of size k has the maximum value of 4k2 at the
center and minimum value of zero at edges. Any other value
is the linear interpolation of the maximum and minimum
values.
Table 4 presents the results for this experiment. The fool-
ing rate of attacks is 100% when the source and target mod-
els are the same. This suggests that the type of smooth-
ing functions does not constrain the performance of APs.
Hence, a broad range of smoothing functions can be de-
ployed for generating smooth APs. Transferability of ad-
versarial examples consistently improves as the smoothness
of perturbations increases. This demonstrates that smooth-
ness increases the transferability of adversarial examples for
Net. Smoothing Param. VGG16 ResNet101 Inc-V3
- - 100 12.6 8.9
V
G
G
16
Gaussian σ = 5 100 15.8 13.6
σ = 10 100 20.7 15.3
Linear k = 25 100 17.7 11.6
k = 50 100 23.5 14.1
Uniform k = 25 100 16.8 12.0
k = 50 100 21.8 14.6
- - 15.2 100 15.0
R
es
N
et
10
1 Gaussian
σ = 5 17.0 100 18.8
σ = 10 19.9 100 22.5
Linear k = 25 19.8 100 16.9
k = 50 22.8 100 19.7
Uniform k = 25 18.6 100 17.3
k = 50 21.0 100 22.1
Table 4: Transferability of smooth perturbations for black-
box attack. The size of Gaussian kernels is k = 5σ.
Columns show source networks and attack parameters, and
rows show the target models.
σg VGG16 RNet101 RNet152 DNet161 Inc-V3
0 78.3 64.8 63.4 52.9 54.6
1 79.6 66.0 66.8 53.2 57.8
5 82.2 69.9 70.3 57.6 58.6
10 84.5 68.7 69.1 55.9 61.6
Table 5: Transferability of universal smooth APs computed
for VGG16 accross data points and network architectures.
black-box attacks which validates the results reported by
Dong et al. [6]
Universal adversarial perturbations.
We integrate the proposed approach with the universal
adversarial perturbations (UAP) [30] to explore the possi-
bility of finding smooth UAPs. The implementation detail
and the integrated algorithm is available in the Supplemen-
tary. We compute smooth UAPs for VGG16 and then eval-
uate thier transferability on four other networks including
ResNet-101, ResNet-151, DenseNet-161, and Inception-
V3.
Table 5 demonstrates the performance of smooth UAPs
versus smoothness. Increasing smoothness enhances the
transferability of APs across both the data points and net-
work architectures. The transferability on 3 networks dete-
riorates for σg > 5. We attribute this observation to the the-
oretical fact that increasing smoothness also increases the
magnitude of APs. Hence, with the same threshold for the
maximum `∞-norm of smooth UAPs, there always exist a
σg after which the transferability decreases.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we explored the vulnerability extent of
DNNs to smooth adversarial perturbations by propos-
ing SmoothFool, a framework for computing `2-minimal
smooth APs. The methodology is developed based on a
broad definition of smoothness and can be extended to pose
any frequency-domain constraint on perturbations. Through
extensive experiments, we demonstrated that smooth adver-
sarial perturbations are robust against two major group of
defense strategies. Smoothness also improves the transfer-
ability of adversarial examples across network architectures
and data points. Furthermore, our results suggest that class
categories exhibit variable susceptibility to smooth pertur-
bations which can help interpret the decision of DNNs for
different categories.
References
[1] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness
of neural networks. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[2] N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Audio adversarial examples: Tar-
geted attacks on speech-to-text. In 2018 IEEE Security and
Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 1–7. IEEE, 2018.
[3] K. Chatfield, K. Simonyan, A. Vedaldi, and A. Zisserman.
Return of the devil in the details: Delving deep into convo-
lutional nets. arXiv preprint arXiv:1405.3531, 2014.
[4] A. Dabouei, S. Soleymani, J. Dawson, and N. M. Nasrabadi.
Fast geometrically-perturbed adversarial faces. In IEEE Win-
ter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision (WACV),
2019.
[5] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-
Fei. Imagenet: A large-scale hierarchical image database.
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2009. CVPR
2009. IEEE Conference on, pages 248–255. Ieee, 2009.
[6] Y. Dong, T. Pang, H. Su, and J. Zhu. Evading defenses to
transferable adversarial examples by translation-invariant at-
tacks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 4312–4321, 2019.
[7] K. Eykholt, I. Evtimov, E. Fernandes, B. Li, A. Rahmati,
C. Xiao, A. Prakash, T. Kohno, and D. Song. Robust
physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), pages 1625–1634, 2018.
[8] A. Fawzi, S. M. Moosavi Dezfooli, and P. Frossard. The
robustness of deep networks-a geometric perspective. IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, 34, 2017.
[9] A. Fawzi, S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, P. Frossard, and
S. Soatto. Empirical study of the topology and geometry
of deep networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2018.
[10] V. Fischer, M. C. Kumar, J. H. Metzen, and T. Brox. Ad-
versarial examples for semantic image segmentation. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1703.01101, 2017.
[11] R. C. Fong and A. Vedaldi. Interpretable explanations of
black boxes by meaningful perturbation. In 2017 IEEE in-
ternational conference on computer vision (ICCV), pages
3449–3457. IEEE, 2017.
[12] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and
harnessing adversarial examples. In International Confer-
ence on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[13] K. Grosse, N. Papernot, P. Manoharan, M. Backes, and
P. McDaniel. Adversarial examples for malware detection.
In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security,
pages 62–79. Springer, 2017.
[14] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual learn-
ing for image recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE con-
ference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages
770–778, 2016.
[15] M. Hein and M. Andriushchenko. Formal guarantees on the
robustness of a classifier against adversarial manipulation. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS),
pages 2266–2276, 2017.
[16] J. Hendrik Metzen, M. Chaithanya Kumar, T. Brox, and
V. Fischer. Universal adversarial perturbations against se-
mantic image segmentation. In Proceedings of the IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), pages
2755–2764, 2017.
[17] H. Hosseini and R. Poovendran. Semantic adversarial exam-
ples. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops, pages 1614–
1619, 2018.
[18] S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and
P. Abbeel. Adversarial attacks on neural network policies.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.02284, 2017.
[19] S. T. Jan, J. Messou, Y.-C. Lin, J.-B. Huang, and G. Wang.
Connecting the digital and physical world: Improving the
robustness of adversarial attacks. In The Thirty-Third AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’19), 2019.
[20] S. Jetley, N. Lord, and P. Torr. With friends like these, who
needs adversaries? In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems (NIPS), pages 10772–10782, 2018.
[21] A. Krizhevsky and G. Hinton. Learning multiple layers of
features from tiny images. Technical report, Citeseer, 2009.
[22] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton. Imagenet
classification with deep convolutional neural networks. In
Advances in neural information processing systems, pages
1097–1105, 2012.
[23] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversarial exam-
ples in the physical world. arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.02533,
2016.
[24] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, and P. Haffner. Gradient-
based learning applied to document recognition. Proceed-
ings of the IEEE, 86(11):2278–2324, 1998.
[25] Y. LeCun, C. Cortes, and C. Burges. MNIST handwritten
digit database. AT&T Labs [Online]. Available: http://yann.
lecun. com/exdb/mnist, 2, 2010.
[26] F. Liao, M. Liang, Y. Dong, T. Pang, X. Hu, and J. Zhu. De-
fense against adversarial attacks using high-level representa-
tion guided denoiser. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2018.
[27] A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and
A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to ad-
versarial attacks. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2018.
[28] D. Meng and H. Chen. Magnet: a two-pronged defense
against adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the 2017
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security, pages 135–147. ACM, 2017.
[29] A. Modas, S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, and P. Frossard. Sparse-
fool: a few pixels make a big difference. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.02248, 2018.
[30] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and
P. Frossard. Universal adversarial perturbations. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), pages 1765–1773, 2017.
[31] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard. Deep-
fool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural net-
works. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 2574–2582, 2016.
[32] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Shrivastava, and O. Tuzel. Di-
vide, denoise, and defend against adversarial attacks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.06806, 2018.
[33] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, S. Jha, M. Fredrikson, Z. B. Celik,
and A. Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adversar-
ial settings. In Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE
European Symposium on, pages 372–387. IEEE, 2016.
[34] A. Prakash, N. Moran, S. Garber, A. DiLillo, and J. Storer.
Deflecting adversarial attacks with pixel deflection. In Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, pages 8571–8580, 2018.
[35] P. Samangouei, M. Kabkab, and R. Chellappa. Defense-
GAN: Protecting classifiers against adversarial attacks using
generative models. In International Conference on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2018.
[36] A. Shafahi, W. R. Huang, C. Studer, S. Feizi, and T. Gold-
stein. Are adversarial examples inevitable? In International
Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2019.
[37] M. Sharif, S. Bhagavatula, L. Bauer, and M. K. Reiter. Ac-
cessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-
the-art face recognition. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM
SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, pages 1528–1540. ACM, 2016.
[38] D. Song, K. Eykholt, I. Evtimov, E. Fernandes, B. Li,
A. Rahmati, F. Tramer, A. Prakash, and T. Kohno. Physical
adversarial examples for object detectors. In 12th {USENIX}
Workshop on Offensive Technologies ({WOOT} 18), 2018.
[39] J. Su, D. V. Vargas, and S. Kouichi. One pixel attack for fool-
ing deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.08864,
2017.
[40] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan,
I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[41] F. Tramr, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh,
and P. McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks
and defenses. In International Conference on Learning Rep-
resentations (ICLR), 2018.
[42] C. Xiao, J.-Y. Zhu, B. Li, W. He, M. Liu, and D. Song.
Spatially transformed adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1801.02612, 2018.
[43] C. Xie, J. Wang, Z. Zhang, Y. Zhou, L. Xie, and A. Yuille.
Adversarial examples for semantic segmentation and object
detection. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Confer-
ence on Computer Vision (ICCV), 2017.
[44] Y. Zhang, K. Lee, and H. Lee. Augmenting supervised neu-
ral networks with unsupervised objectives for large-scale im-
age classification. In International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML), pages 612–621, 2016.
6. Setup for smooth UAPs.
We use the setup in [30] and perform two modifications
to its main algorithm to find smooth UAPs. First, we replace
DeepFool [31] with the SmoothFool algorithm. Second, we
replace the clipping method, based on projection operator,
with SmoothClip. SmoothClip algorithm smoothly clips r
to make sure x+r resides in [0, 1]. However, for the smooth
UAP v, SmoothClip should clip v to [−ξ, ξ]. Since the new
bound is not dependent on x anymore, we replace x with
an all-zero matrix, 0, of a same size as x. Furthermore, we
normalize v before the clipping and denormalize it after the
clipping. This allows us to utilize SmoothClip without mod-
ifying its algorithm. Smooth perturbation in each iteration
is projected smoothly to the l∞-ball of ξ = 10/255 around
the original sample. The  of SmoothClip is set to 0.1, and
the universal fooling rate τ is set to 0.9. For computing
smooth UAP, we exploit m = 10, 000 benign samples from
the validation set of ILSVRC2012 [5]. Algorithm 3 details
the algorithm for finding smooth UAPs.
7. Further results
Figure 9 demonstrates further smooth UAPs computed
for different network architectures. Figures 10-24 show sev-
eral examples of generated smooth perturbations for images
from the validation set of ILSVRC2012 and different net-
work architectures. Each figure demonstrates the results for
a fixed value of σg . Each row, from top to bottom, shows
benign images, adversarial images, and the corresponding
smooth APs, respectively. The predicted label for each im-
age is overlaid on the image in red-colored text. The target
network architecture and the smoothing factor σg for each
figure is denoted in the caption.
Algorithm 3 Computation of smooth UAPs.
1: input: Data points X = {x1, . . . ,xm}, classifier f
and the associated class predictor c, desired fooling rate
τ , low-pass filter g, desired `∞-norm ξ.
2: output: Smooth UAP v.
3: Initialize v ← 0.
4: while
1
m
m∑
i=1
1>0(|c(xi)− c(xi + v)|) < τ do
5: for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
6: if c(xi + v) = c(xi) then
7: ri = SmoothFool(f,xi, g)
8: v ← v + ri
9: v ← (v/ξ + 1) ∗ 0.5
10: v ← SmoothClip(0,v, g, )
11: v ← (2 ∗ v − 1) ∗ ξ
12: end if
13: end for
14: end while
15: return v.
Figure 9: Smooth UAPs computed for three network archi-
tectures on ImageNet. Rows and columns show the results
on different smoothing levels and network architectures, re-
spectively.
Figure 10: Network architecture: VGG-16, σg = 10.
Figure 11: Network architecture: VGG-16, σg = 20.
Figure 12: Network architecture: VGG-16, σg = 50.
Figure 13: Network architecture: ResNet-101, σg = 10.
Figure 14: Network architecture: ResNet-101, σg = 20.
Figure 15: Network architecture: ResNet-101, σg = 50.
Figure 16: Network architecture: DenseNet-161, σg = 10.
Figure 17: Network architecture: DenseNet-161, σg = 20.
Figure 18: Network architecture: DenseNet-161, σg = 50.
Figure 19: Network architecture: Inception-V3, σg = 10.
Figure 20: Network architecture: Inception-V3, σg = 20.
Figure 21: Network architecture: Inception-V3, σg = 50.
Figure 22: Network architecture: ResNet-152, σg = 10.
Figure 23: Network architecture: ResNet-152, σg = 20.
Figure 24: Network architecture: ResNet-152, σg = 50.
